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The following report covers the line of the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh) from 31 January to 6 February 1949. Subsequent events, as reported in [REDACTED] have modified this program.

1. Unification of anti-government parties was the principal work of the PCCh, and the cells were kept constantly busy. The policy of keeping the cells occupied was of prime importance in avoiding disturbances in the negotiations between parties. The regional offices were given definite tasks, such as the formation of committees, and organization of plans for local economic improvement. These tasks kept the militants occupied, so that they did not lose their training and did not cause difficulties in the negotiations of the Party leaders.
2. Negotiations with the Socialists were very difficult, because of the opposition of several of the directors and in particular of Raul Ampuero. Although Eugenio Gonzales is Secretary General of the Party, Raul Ampuero has the greatest influence, which he used against attempts at unification. On the other side, Communist leaders had difficulty in convincing their Party members that they must not attack the Socialists, and that they must accept the alliances with various parties as a matter of vital importance to the PCCh.
3. The most effective work was carried out in the provinces, where efforts to improve conditions were going forward under the direction of local committees. The Communist sponsorship of the work of these committees was concealed, and people who are antipathetic to the Party were unwittingly working to carry out Communist directives.
4. While this work was being carried out among the masses, the national directorate worked with the top levels, or national heads of the various parties. The Communists figured that if the negotiations were successful, the work would be well under way, and if unsuccessful, at least the Communist Party elements would have penetrated other fields, which while less closely directed and with less political experience, would be easily guided by members of the Communist Party along Party lines.
5. The Party endeavored to maintain its own objectives, without closing the door on people who could aid it. Support for the candidacy of Carlos Ibanez del Campo came about by following this idea. Ibanez has great influence among the military and also with the workers in the provinces. The latter remember him for the many

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laws he sponsored which benefited them. He built bridges, roads, public buildings, and caused social laws to be passed. The Communists realized that he had the support of large numbers of laboring people, and supported his candidacy. They counted on his influence with the Agrarian-Laborists to assure them of the support of that party.

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